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Abstract. This paper extends previous research which has examined the market impact of
large transactions in bull and bear markets by examining the information effects of trades.
Previous research has demonstrated that the information effects of buy trades are greater
than the information effects of sell trades. We develop a theoretical model which predicts
that this difference is greater in bear markets than bull markets, consistent with the (almost
counter-intuitive) proposition that buy trades are relatively more informed in bear markets.
Using a sample of trades executed on the NYSE in bull and bear market periods, we find
evidence consistent with our primary theoretical model.
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1. Introduction
A large set of literature has examined the price impact of large or block trades in securities
markets.1 Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) are typical. Using a sample of block
buy and sell trades executed on the New York Stock Exchange between 1982 and 1984 they
demonstrate the following 3 asymmetries in the impact of block purchases and sales. First,
that the total price impact of purchases is greater than sales. That is, that the magnitude
of the difference between the price at which a block purchase is executed relative to the
equilibrium price prior to the trade, is greater than the magnitude of the difference in the
price at which a block sale is executed relative to the equilibrium price prior to the trade.
Second, they documented an asymmetry in the so-called ‘temporary ’price impact of trades.
That is, that prices reverse following block sales but continue moving upwards following
block purchases. This implies that block sales pay a liquidity premium to trade whereas
block purchases do not. Third, they documents that the permanent price impact associated
with purchases is greater than sales. That is, that the magnitude of the change in the price
of a stock from the equilibrium price prior to a block purchase to the equilibrium price
following the purchase, is greater than the magnitude of the change in the price of a stock
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from the equilibrium price prior to a block sale to the equilibrium price following the sale.
This implies that, on average, block purchases convey more information to the market than
block sales.
Chiyachantana et. al (2004) extend previous work, by examining the total price impact
of trades in bull and bear markets. Using ‘packages ’of sell trades and buy trades executed
by institutional investors in 37 countries including the USA, they find that the magnitude
of the total price impact of buys is greater than the magnitude of the price impact of sells
in a bull market period sampled from 1997 and a bear market period sampled from 2001.
They conclude that
“our results seem to suggest that due to large trade sizes the institutional trades tend to be
affected by market conditions and pay a higher premium for liquidity when they trade on
the same side of the market. This finding suggests that the liquidity available to buy (sell)
orders is higher in bearish (bullish) markets. This explanation of the asymmetry in price
impact is very intuitive and, yet, was not explored in the previous studies because they were
all conducted when the market was in a bullish phase.”[p. 871.]
While Chiyachantana et. al (2004) examine the total effects of trades, they do not ex-
amine the permanent or information effects of trades. Consequently, we extend the Chiy-
achantana et. al (2004) analysis by examining the information effects of large or block
trades in bull and bear markets. We develop a theoretical model á la Easley and O’Hara
(1987) which produces somewhat counter-intuitive predictions of the information effect of
block buy trades relative to sell trades in bull and bear markets. We then test the predic-
tions of the model using a sample of data drawn from the bull and bear market periods
examined by Chiyachana et.al (2004). To our knowledge, no other study has examined the
information effects of block buy and sell trades in bull and bear market conditions.
In our sequential trading model traders are allowed to transact order for block (large)
or small quantities. Risk neutral informed traders prefer to trade in blocks at any given
prices. Consequently, the market maker sets a wider spread for block traders. However, if
the market width is large enough, informed traders place only large orders and small orders
are uninformative in equilibrium.2 A crucial assumption is that informed traders are averse
to short sales. This behavioural assumption gives informed traders a disincentive to sell the
asset and can reduce the information content of sell orders. Indeed, we show that, if the
market width is large enough, the information effects of block buys is always larger than
the information effects of block sells, because of the short sales aversion. Moreoever, in
our model, contrarian signals are more valuable than confirming signals. Indeed, traders
getting an adverse signal on the true asset value have a larger informational advantage than
traders getting a favourable signal if the market is in a bullish phase and lower informa-
tional advantage if the market is in a bearish phase. This yields the interesting empirical
implication that the difference between the information effects of block purchases and sales
is higher in bear markets than in a bull markets.
We analyse a sample of individual transactions (not packages) executed in S&P 500
stocks during the bull and bear market periods identified by Chiyachantana et. al (2004).
Using a method similar to Holthausen et. al (1990) we re-document the asymmetry in the
permanent price impact of trades in that the average permanent price impact of buys is
greater than the permanent price impact of sells across the entire (bull and bear market)
2Easley and O’Hara (1987) describe the necessary conditions for the separating equilibrium where informed
traders place only large orders.
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sample period. Further, we re-document the finding of Chiyachantana et. al (2004) using
our sample of individual transactions, and find that the total price impact of buys is greater
than sales in a bull market and the total price impact of sells is greater than buys in a bear
market. We then proceed to test the main prediction of our theory. Consistent with our
theory, we find that the permanent price impact of purchases is greater than the information
effects of sales and that this difference is greater in bear markets than bull markets. The
remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the theoretical
model. In section 3 we derive empirical predictions about the asymmetric price impact of
block trades in bearish and bullish markets. In section 4 we describe our data and method
used to test the theoretical predictions of the model. In section 5 we report the results of our
analysis, while section 6 provides a summary and conclusion. All proofs of propositions
are in the appendix.
2. The Model
2.1 The Economy
We consider a sequential trading model analogous to Easley and O’Hara (1987), simplified
because there is no event uncertainty.
The market is for a risky asset which is exchanged among a sequence of risk neutral
traders and competitive market makers who are responsible for quoting prices. The liqui-
dation value Ṽ of the asset can be low (Ṽ = V = 0) or high (Ṽ = V = 1 ). The ex-ante
probability of Ṽ = V is π0 ∈ (0, 1).
Trades occur sequentially, with only one trader allowed to transact at any point in time.
The trader whose turn it is to transact may either buy a small or a large quantity, or sell a
small or a large quantity, or refrain from trading.
We denote order size using QS and QL for small and large orders, respectively (hence
QS < QL). A ≡ {SQL, SQS , BQS , BQL, NT} is the traders’ action set, with SQi
and BQi indicating, respectively, a sell and a buy order for quantity Qi, with i = S, L, and
NT indicating no trading.
There are two types of traders: liquidity traders (fraction 1 − µ) and institutional traders
(fraction µ). We assume that liquidity traders choose to submit large or small sell and buy
orders, or to refrain from trading with equal probability 1/5. We denote the probability that
an uninformed trader submits a given order as γ ≡ 1−µ5 .
Institutional traders privately observe a signal θ correlated with the final asset value.
3 Institutional traders choose the trading strategy that maximizes their profits given the
quoted bid and ask prices. However, we assume that, because of restrictions to short sales,
institutional traders limit themselves to selling the asset only if it is in their portfolio.4 The
fraction of informed traders who own the asset and, hence, can sell it is δ ∈ (0; 1].5
3All results remain true even if private signals are imperfect, that is, if Pr(θ|V ) and/or Pr(θ|V ) are lower
than 1.
4Keim and Madhavan (1995) propose the traders aversion to short selling as a possible reason for differences
in the information content of trades. They suggest that buy are more informationally motivated than sells
because institutional traders can choose between many potential assets to buy, but when they sell, they usually
can choose only between assets they already own due to short selling constraints.
5We use the terms "institutional traders" and "informed traders" interchangeably.
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Before a trader arrives, each market maker sets bid and ask prices at which he is willing
to trade each asset quantity.
We denote the probability that the market makers attache to V at time t by πt and the
market makers’ expectation at time t is Et[Ṽ ]. Since V = 0 and V = 1, Et[Ṽ ] = πt. We
define the market as bearish when the low is more likely than the high asset value and as
bullish when the high is more likely than the low asset value. Hence, a bullish market is
characterized by π > 1\2 and a bearish market by π < 1\2. Finally, the expected asset
value of an informed trader is denoted by E[Ṽ | θ] and, since private signals are perfect, it
is equal to 1 if θ = θ and to 0 in the other case.
2.2 Equilibrium Strategies and Prices
At the beginning of any trading round t, the market maker set her quote prices. We denote
the best price schedule at time t by Pt. Clearly
Pt = {BL, t, BS, t, AS, t, AL, t },
where BL, t and AL, t are the bid and the ask prices for the large orders, whilst BS, t and
AS, t are the bid and the ask prices for the small orders.
After prices are set, a trader is randomly selected to trade, observes the price schedules
and executes her strategy at the best price, or refrains from trading. If he is a liquidity
trader, he acts in an ex-ante specified probabilistic way. If he is informed, he chooses the
strategy which maximizes her expected profit given the price schedule.
The market maker anticipates the traders’ strategies and announces her price schedule.
Bertrand competition restricts the market makers to earn zero expected profit from each
trade. Hence, the trader arriving at t faces a price schedule which satisfies:
Bi, t = Et[Ṽ |SQi] =
Pr(SQi|V )π
Pr(SQi|V )π+Pr(SQi|V )(1−π)





for all i ∈ {S, L}.
Since the market makers are imperfectly informed about the liquidation asset value, com-
petitive prices are always between 0 and 1. If the true asset value is high, institutional
traders receive the good signal and buy the asset when they arrive at a market maker. On
the other hand, if the true asset value is low, institutional traders receive the bad signal
and sell the asset if it is in their portfolio (with probability δ) when they arrive at a market
maker. It is clear that, since private signals are perfect, the probability of an informed buyer
conditional on the low asset value, and the probability of an informed seller conditional on
the high asset value, are both zero. This implies that Pr(BQi|V ) = Pr(SQi|V ) = γ for
both small and large orders.
From Easley and O’Hara (1987) we know that, depending on the parameters of the
model, two outcomes may prevail on each side of the market. If informed traders pre-
fer to trade only a large quantity, they are separated from small liquidity traders and a
separating equilibrium arises. If informed traders submit either small or large orders with
strictly positive probability, a pooling equilibrium occurs.
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We first examine the market in the separating equilibrium. In this market, the competitive






L }, is such that informed traders place only large
orders (or refrain from trading if they observe the bad signal and do not own the asset).
Thus, small trades are not information-based and do not affect the public belief about the
true asset value, while the information content of block trades is very strong.
This implies that the equilibrium price for small orders is given by: 6
BseS = A
se
S = E[Ṽ ] = π














where γ + µδ and γ are the probabilities of a block sell order conditional on Ṽ = 0 and
Ṽ = 1, respectively, and γ + µ and γ are the probabilities of a block buy order conditional
on Ṽ = 1 and Ṽ = 0, respectively. Notice that because of short selling constraints,
information-motivated purchases are more likely than information-motivated sells.
The separating equilibrium arises if, given the price schedule P se, informed traders prefer
to trade only the large quantity. This occurs when the profit due to the larger quantity
exceeds the better price available for small trades, that is when:
Πseθ, L(π)QL ≥ Π
se
θ S(π)QS , (2)





(π) ≡ 1 − AseL are the separating marginal profits of an
institutional trader when the final asset value is low and high, respectively, and Πθ L ≡
E[Ṽ ] and Πθ L ≡ 1 − E[Ṽ ] represent the deviation marginal profits, that is, the marginal
profits of an institutional trader who deviates from the "separating" strategy when the final
asset value is low and high, respectively.7 Rearranging terms and substituting the price






= 1 + fθ(π), (3)






= 1 + fθ(π), (4)
with fθ(π) ≡ πµ/γ, for the ask side of the market. The left side of conditions (3) and (4)
represents the market width. For the separating equilibrium to prevail, it has to be larger
than the ratio between the deviation and the separating marginal profits on each side of the
market.
Conditions (3) and (4) point out that (i) the ratio between deviation and separating
marginal profits of an institutional seller reduces when the public belief increases and,
then, on the bid side the separating equilibrium is more likely to arise in bull rather than
bear markets (fθ(π) is, indeed, decreasing in π), whilst (ii) the ratio between deviation
6To simplify notation hereafter we will omit the t subscript.
7Recall that E[eV | θ] = 0 and E[eV | θ] = 1.
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and separating marginal profits of an institutional buyer reduces when the public belief de-
creases and, then, on the ask side it is more likely to arise in bear rather than in bull markets
(fθ(π) is, indeed, increasing in π) (see figure I). To gain some intuition, consider the ask
side of the market. The difference between the profit from buying the large and the small
quantity can be written as follows
(1 − AseL )(QL − QS) − (A
se
L − π)QS . (5)
The first term represents the separating gain due to the greater quantity of asset bought
and the second term is the loss due to the higher price paid to purchase the first QS units
of the asset. An institutional trader observing the good signal chooses to buy large with
probability 1 if this difference is positive. Notice that an increase in the public belief affects
both those components of the difference between the profit from buying the large and the
small quantity. The effect on the separating gain is negative since the ask price is increasing
in π. The effect on the loss due to the higher price paid to purchase the first QS units of
the asset is ambiguous and depends on the magnitude of π. Indeed, when π is 0 or 1
the distance between AseL and π is zero, whilst it grows as the uncertainty in the market
increases (i, e., π tends to 1/2). This implies that the impact of an increase in the public
belief on (AseL −π) is positive for low values of π and becomes negative as π grows enough.
Since (5) is positive if and only if condition (4) is satisfied, we can conclude that the first
effect dominates the second one ((AseL − π)/(1 − A
se
L ) is, indeed, equal to fθ(π)).
To conclude, it is also worth noting that the more short selling constraints are severe
(lower δ), the more the separating equilibrium is likely in the bid side of the market. Indeed,
the adverse selection problem on the bid side of the market is less severe when δ is low,
since the probability of an information-motivated sell order is lower. As a consequence, the
bid price for the large quantity is nearer to bid price for the small quantity and the incentive
to sell a large quantity for an institutional seller is higher (see figure I in the Appendix).
If conditions (3) and (4) are not satisfied on either side of the market, then there can be no
separating equilibrium on that side of the market and there will be a pooling equilibrium.
In a pooling equilibrium there is a positive probability of the informed trading in both
large and small quantities. More precisely, an institutional trader plays a mixed strategy
σθ ≡ {σθ,S ;σθ,L} defined on the simplex ∆(SQS , SQL), if he observes θ and the asset
is in its portfolio. He plays the mixed strategy σθ ≡ {σθ,S ;σθ,L} defined on the simplex
∆(BQS , BQL) if he observes θ.























L } in the
pooling equilibrium, informed traders must be indifferent between trading the block or the
small quantity. This condition requires
(BpeL − E[Ṽ | θ])QL = (B
pe
S − E[Ṽ | θ])QS (7)
(E[Ṽ | θ] − ApeL )QL = (E[Ṽ | θ] − A
pe
S )QS . (8)
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It is easy to see that conditions (7) and (8) can be satisfied only if the price schedule is






S . This, in turn, implies that institutional traders are
more likely to place the large than the small order.
The pooling equilibrium prevails if condition (2) is not satisfied, that is if the relative
distance between deviation and separating profits is larger than the market width. From the
previous paragraph we know that private signals are more valuable when they indicate the
opposite asset value with respect to the public belief. More precisely, if the liquidation asset
value is low, the distance between deviation and separating profits of institutional traders
(sellers) is larger when the public belief (and, then, the bid price) is higher, whilst if the
liquidation asset value is high, the distance between deviation and separating profits of in-
stitutional traders (buyers) is larger when the public belief (and, then, the ask price) is lower.
As a consequence, informed sellers are more prone to separate themselves from small liq-
uidity traders in bullish markets and the probability of a large information-based sale, σθ,L,
is increasing in π, whilst institutional buyers are more prone to separate themselves from
small liquidity traders in bearish markets and the probability of a large information-based
purchase, σθ,L, is decreasing in π.
3. The price impact of block trades
In our model, the price impact of a trade is the change in the public belief about the liqui-
dation asset value due to that trade. Since institutional traders never sell when observing
the good signal and never buy when observing the bad signal, the price impact of a sell
is always negative and the price impact of a buy is always positive. The magnitude of the
price impact of a trade depends both on the trade’s information content and on the weight
the market maker attaches to this information.
The information content of a trade is related to its likelihood ratio, that is, the ratio
between the probability of the trade conditional to Ṽ = V and the probability of the order
conditional to Ṽ = V . If a trade is totally uninformative about the true asset value then
its likelihood ratio is equal to 1; the more informative the trade is, the more its likelihood
ratio differs from 1. More specifically, the more informative is a block sale, the more its
likelihood ratio is higher than 1 and the more informative is a a block purchase, the more
its likelihood ratio is lower than 1. So, we can define the information content of a block
sale as its likelihood ratio and the information content of a block purchase as the reciprocal
of its likelihood ratio.
The weight the market maker attaches to the information content of a trade is related
to the uncertainty about the assetÕs fundamental value. When in the market there is high
uncertainty about the true asset value (that is, when π is sufficiently far from 0 and 1), then
the market maker attaches high weight to the trades’ information content. But, when the
public belief converges to the low or to the high asset value, then the importance of the
trades’ information content is lower.
Given the unconditional public belief π, the price impact measure of a block sale is:
∆S(π) ≡ |BL − π| =
π (1 − π) (λS(π) − 1)
π + (1 − π)λS(π)
, (9)
where λS(π) ≡ Pr(SQL|π, V )\Pr(SQL|π, V ) is the trade’s information content, condi-
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tional on the public belief π, and the price impact measure of a block purchase is:
∆B(π) ≡ |AL − π| =
π (1 − π) (λB(π) − 1)
πλB(π) + (1 − π)
, (10)
where λB(π) ≡ Pr(BQL|π, V )\Pr(BQL|π, V ) is the trade’s information content, condi-
tional on π. Notice that, on both sides of the market, the price impact of a block trade is
increasing in its information content, and that both ∆S(π) and ∆B(π) are zero when π is
equal to 0 or 1.
Let the price impact asymmetry expression of the asset for block trades to be defined as:
J(π) ≡ ∆B(π) − ∆S(π). (11)
Ji(π) is larger than, equal to, or lower than 0 if and only if the price impact of a block
purchase is, respectively, larger than, equal to, or lower than the price impact of a block
sale.
Proposition 1. If the market width is large enough and the short selling constraints are
significant then the price impact of a block purchase is always larger than the price impact
of a block sale.
When the market width is high (i.e., QL/QS is large), the separating equilibrium arises
for all public beliefs and the information content of trades is λS(π) = (γ + µ δ )/γ ≡ λS
on the bid side and λB(π) = (γ + µ )/γ ≡ λB on the ask side of the market. In the
absence of short selling constraints, λS = λB and the sign of J(π) will depend on the
public belief. However, if short selling constraints are severe, i.e., δ is fairly small, sell
orders coming from institutional traders are quite unlikely. As a consequence, block sales
have small information content (lower than block purchases) and, then, their price impact
will be lower than that of purchases. With low market width this result may not be true.
Indeed, if QL/QS is low, the ask side of a bullish market could be characterized by a
pooling equilibrium, whilst the bid side by the separating equilibrium (see conditions (4)
and (3) and figure I). In this case, the probability that a trader observing the good signal
buys the asset (µσθ, L) could be lower than the probability that a trader observing the bad
signal sells the asset (µδ), despite the short selling constraints. This would imply that block
sales have higher information content than block purchases and, then, their price impact
would be greater than that of purchases.
The public belief about an asset value captures the equilibrium price prior to a trade.
Recall that a bullish market is characterized by π > 1/2 and a bearish market by π < 1/2.
This leads to the following result.
Proposition 2. The price impact asymmetry expression is higher in a bear market than in
a bull market.
The rationale for the result in Proposition 2 is the following. The equilibrium bid and ask
prices for block trades can be viewed as the weighted averages between the public belief
and the asset assessment of institutional sellers or buyers. In a bull market, the public belief
is nearer to the asset assessment of institutional buyers (1) than to the asset assessment of
institutional sellers (0), whilst the opposite is true in a bear market. As a consequence,
all other things being equal, in a bull market the price impact of a block purchase (i.e.,
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the distance between the ask price and the public belief) is lower than that of a block sale
(i.e., the distance between the public belief and the bid price), whilst in a bear market the
price impact of a block purchase is larger. This issue is amplified by the fact that in a
bull market, the information content of block purchases cannot exceed that of block sales,
and in a bear market, the information content of block sales cannot exceed that of block
purchases. Indeed, the profit of traders observing a signal contrary to the price path, that is,
a good signal in a bear market or a bad signal in a bull market, is larger and induces them
to be more aggressive, that is, to trade the large quantity with higher probability.
4. Data and Method
The theory developed in the previous section implies that the asymmetry in the permanent
price impact of block trades (ie. that the permanent price impact of buys is greater than
sales) is greater in a bear market than in a bull market. Following Chiyachantana et. al
(2004), the bull market period examined in this study extends from 1 January to 31 Decem-
ber 1997, while the bear market period extends over the first quarter of 2001. The dataset
available for this study is similar to the dataset examined by Holthausen et. al (1990) in that
it is trade and quote data. In contrast, Chiyachantana et.al (2004) examined packages of
trades executed by single institutions. We begin the analysis by re-documenting the asym-
metry in the price impact of a sample of block trades across the entire sample period (both
bull and bear) using a research method similar to Hothausen et.al (1990), but updated to
take into account recent developments in research design and peculiarities of the sample
periods we examine.
We consider all trades executed in stocks in the S&P 500 traded on the New York Stock
Exchange over the bull and bear market sample period between 9.30am and 4.00pm. The
transaction data used in this study was sourced from Thompson Reuters and is managed
and distributed by the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia Pacific.
Holthausen et.al (1990), use a tick-rule to classify trades into buyer-initiated (upticks)
and seller-initiated (downticks), which has been demonstrated to misclassify trades. Con-
sequently, we follow Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) who use quote based rule to clas-
sify all trades as buyer and seller. Specifically, if a trade occurs at the contemporaneous
ask price, the trade is classified as buyer-initiated. Conversely, if the trade is executed at
the contemporaneous bid price, then the trade is classified as seller-initiated. Trades which
execute at neither the bid nor ask price are classified using the tick test. That is, if the last
price change was an uptick, the trade is buyer-initiated, and if the last price change was a
downtick, the trade is seller-initiated. Bessembinder (2003) argues the merits of the Ellis
et. al (2000) classification method vis-á-vis the Lee and Ready (1991) quote method, and
tick test for NYSE trade and quote data.
After partitioning trades into buyer or seller initiated, we identify a sample of ÒblockÓ
trades. We rely on Holthausen et.al. (1990) definition and sample the 50 largest blocks by
trade direction for each stock over each sample period examined (ie. bull market period,
bear market period and both combined bull and bear market periods).
The price effects of block trades are measured as follows:
















where Pprior is the equilibrium market price prior to the block transaction, and Ppost is the
equilibrium price after a block trade has been executed. Pblock represents the price of the
block trade.
In this study two proxies are utilised for equilibrium prices prior and post block trade
execution. Following Chiyachantana et al (2004) closing prices on the day before a trade
is executed is used as a proxy for Pprior, where the closing price is the price of the last
trade before 4.00pm. For analysis of price effects measured intraday as in Holthausen et al
(1990), the trade price immediately preceding the block is used to proxy Pprior, while the
transaction price five minutes after the block trade are used to proxy for Ppost respectively.
Rather than sample prices in transaction time as in Holthausen et. al (1990) (eg. the price
of trade t+5 relative to the block trade), we sample prices in calendar time (ie. 5 minutes
after the block trade has occurred). We do this, as we find that there are large differences in
the time between trades during the bull and bear market periods examined which can effect
results.
For analysis of price effects using intraday data, we are able to implement a control
which enables us to isolate the price impact caused by the larger trade size. Specifically,
the price effects of block trades are compared to the price effects of a sample of non-block
trades. Following Holtahusen et. al (1990) we match each block transaction with a 100-
share transaction of the same trade direction (i.e. buyer or seller initiated) by searching
prior to the block trade -16 before the block. The difference between the price impacts of
block and nonblock trades is referred to as the net effect.
5. Results
Table I in the Appendix documents descriptive statistics for the initial sample of block
transactions examined in this study. The table documents that there are 19,000 buy and sell
transactions sampled across the full sample period. The average trade size of purchases
is approximately $ 4.9 million or 120,300 shares while the average size of sales is $ 5.6
million or 139,204 shares Ð confirming that they are block trades by any definition, and
larger than the NYSE definition of a block trade (10,000 shares). Similar conclusions can
be drawn from the samples drawn separately from bull and bear markets, though there is
evidence that trades sampled were larger during the (earlier) bull market period than the
bear market period, both in shares as well as in dollar value terms.
Hotlhausen et.al (1990) document that the total price effect of block buys is predomi-
nately permanent and there is very little evidence of a temporary price impact (or reversal
following the trade), while the total price effect of block sales contains a temporary com-
ponent which is significantly reversed following the block trade. Table in the Appendix
documents total, temporary and permanent price effects for block purchases and sales ex-
amined in this study across the entire combined sample period (ie. in both bull and bear
markets). Our sample of block trades behaves very similarly to Holthasen et. al (1990).
Specifically, there is no evidence of a price reversal following block purchases. The tem-
porary price effect following block purchases is also negative, implying the price continues
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moving upwards after a block purchase, even after controlling for normal market move-
ments following purchases using the nonblock sample. Further, the temporary price effect
following block sales is also negative, implying the price rebounds after block sales, even
after controlling for normal market movements following sales using the nonblock sample.
Similarly to Holthausen et. al (1990) we conclude that the total price impact of block trades
is predominately permanent while the total price impact following block sales contains both
a temporary and permanent component. A comparison of the permanent price impact of
block buys and sales confirms that both the raw and net permanent effects of block buys are
greater than block sales. A t test which examines whether the difference in the magnitude
of the permanent price impact of block buys is greater than sales is reported in Panel C,
and confirms that the difference is significant at conventional levels of significance. We
conclude that the price impact asymmetry documented by Holthausen et. al (1990) and
others is also present in our (entire) sample.
Chiyachantana et. al (2004) examine the total price impact of institutional trades during
the bull and bear market periods examined in this study. For a sample of transactions
executed on the NYSE during these sample period they find as follows:
“The patterns of price impact of institutional trading in US stocks (not reported in Table
III) are just as striking; 0.59 percent for purchases and 0.21 percent of sells in 1997 in
contrast to 0.16 percent for purchases and 0.83 percent for sells in 2001.”[p. 884]
Hence, they find that the total price impact of buys is greater than sells in bull markets,
while the total price impact of sells is greater than buys in a bear market. We do not have
trade packages available to us, just individual trades, hence we re-examine the Chiyachan-
tana et.al (2004) hypothesis during the bull and bear sample periods to determine whether
the results documented by Chiyanchantana et.al (2004) hold despite the methodological
and sample differences between this study and theirs.
Table III in the Appendix reports the total impact of buy and sell trades during bull
and bear market sample periods. Recall that similarly to Chiyachantana et. al (2004)
the benchmark price is the closing price on the day prior to the date on which a trade is
executed. While the magnitudes are somewhat smaller, the patterns of the price impact
of trades are just as striking as those documented by Chiyachantana et. al (2004): for
bull markets, the mean total price impact of buys (0.4292) is greater in magnitude than
sells (-0.3178), and a t test reported at the bottom of the table confirms that the magnitude
of the differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. In contrast, for bear
markets, the magnitude of the total price impact of sells (-0.4260) is greater than buys
(0.3349), and again a t test reported at the bottom of the table confirms that the magnitude
of the differences are statistically significant at conventional levels. Hence, the results
documented by Chiyachantana et. al (2004) are robust to any methodological differences.
Having established that our sample behaves entirely like those in previous research in that
(1) there is evidence of an asymmetry in the price impact of trades across the entire sample
period, and (2) the total price impact of buys is greater than sells in a bull market while
the reverse is true in a bear market, we now move to tests of our theory. Specifically, we
examine the permanent price impact of buy and sell trades in bull and bear markets. The
results of this analysis are reported in Table IV in the Appendix.
Table IV documents that the permanent price impact of purchases is greater than the
permanent price impact of sales in both bull and bear markets. However, consistent with
our theory, the differences between the two are greater in a bear market (4 basis points)
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than in a bull market (2 basis points). Furthermore, a significance test is reported in Panel
B, which confirms that the differences in the price impact of buys and sells across the bull
and bear market periods are statistically significant at conventional levels of significance.
This evidence is consistent with our theoretical proposition that buys are relatively more
informative than sells in bear markets relative to bull markets.
Following Chiyachantana et. al (2004) we examine the asymmetry in price impact of
block trades for each of the months sampled. Figure II in the Appendix documents the
differences between the average permanent price impact of buy and sell trades for each
month in our sample drawn from the bear market period (1997) and bull market period
(2001). The diagram illustrates that during the months drawn from the bear market that
the price impact of buys over sells is generally greater (positive) and higher than in the
months drawn from the bull market period. Note that there are 3 months which represent
an exception to this during the bull market period, however in two of those months (March
and August 1997) the average return on the market was negative and hence in those months
in can be argued that the market was in fact bearish. On the balance, there is reasonably
strong evidence consistent with our hypothesis that buy trades have a greater permanent
impact on prices than sell trades during bear markets.
6. Summary and Conclusion
Previous research has documented a ‘puzzle ’in the price impact of block trades, finding
that the information effects of block buy trades is generally greater than the information
effects of block sell trades. Another strand of literature has examined the total price effects
of buy and sell transactions in bull and bear markets. This paper extends this literature
by examining the information effects of block buy trades and block sell trades in bull and
bear market conditions. We develop a theoretical model which predicts that this difference
in the magnitude of the information conveyed by buy trades over sell trades is greater in
bear markets than bull markets, consistent with the (almost counter-intuitive) proposition
that buy trades are relatively more informed in bear markets. Using a sample of trades
executed on the NYSE in bull and bear market period identified in previous research, we
find evidence consistent with our theoretical proposition.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
First consider conditions (3) and (4). Since maxπ fθ(·) = µ δ /γ and maxπ fθ(·) =
µ /γ > µ δ /γ, from conditions (3) and (4) it follows that if QL/QS ≥ µ /γ then the
separating equilibrium prevails on both sides of the market, regardless of public belief.
In the separating equilibrium, λS(π) = (γ + µ δ )/γ ≡ λS and λB(π) = (γ + µ )/γ ≡
λB . By substituting λS and λB in (9) and (10), and then (9) and ( 10) in (11) and rearranging
terms gives
J(π) =
π (1 − π) µ
(π µ + γ)(γ + (1 − π) µ δ)
φ(π; δ),
where φ(π; δ) = γ (1− δ)+ (1− 2π) µ δ. Since minπ φ(· ; δ) = γ (1− δ)− µ δ, we can
conclude that φ(π; δ) is positive for all π iff δ is lower than γ/(γ + µ). 
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume π ≥ 1/2 and define ∆J(π) ≡ J(π) − J(1 − π) as the difference between the
price impact asymmetry in the bullish and in the bearish market.8 Notice that:
∆J(π) ≡ (∆B(π) − ∆S(π)) − (∆B(1 − π) − ∆S(1 − π)) =
= (∆B(π) − ∆B(1 − π)) − (∆S(π) − ∆S(1 − π)).
(12)
We will prove the proposition by showing that this difference is negative if and only if
π ≥ 1/2, both in the separating equilibrium (Step 1) and in the pooling equilibrium (Steps
2 and 3).
Step 1: If the separating equilibrium prevails on both sides of the market both when
E[Ṽ ] = π and when E[Ṽ ] = 1 − π, then ∆J(π) ≤ 0 if and only if π ≥ 1/2.
Assume λS(π) = λS and λB(π) = λB . Substituting (9) in (∆S(π) − ∆S(1 − π))
and rearranging terms gives
∆S(π) − ∆S(1 − π) = −
(1 − 2π) π (1 − π) (λS − 1)
2
(π λS + (1 − π))(π + (1 − π) λS)
, (13)
that is positive since π ≥ 1/2 by assumption. Similarly, substituting (10) in (∆B(π)−
∆B(1 − π)) and rearranging terms gives
∆B(π) − ∆B(1 − π) =
(1 − 2π) π (1 − π) (λB − 1)
2
(π λB + (1 − π))(π + (1 − π)λB)
, (14)
that is negative since π ≥ 1/2. By combining (13) and (14) with (12) we can con-
clude that ∆J(π) is negative.
8Recall that a bullish market is characterized by π > 1\2 and a bearish market by π < 1\2.
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Step 2: If λS(π) ≥ λS(1 − π) and λB(π) ≤ λB(1 − π), then ∆J(π) ≤ 0 if and only if
π ≥ 1/2.
Assume that λS(π) ≥ λS(1 − π) and λB(π) ≤ λB(1 − π). From the previous step,
we know that, if λS(π) = λS(1−π) and λB(π) = λB(1−π), then ∆S(π)−∆S(1−
π) ≥ 0 and ∆B(π) − ∆B(1 − π) ≤ 0 for all π ≥ 1/2. Deriving (9) with respect to





(π + (1 − π) λS)2
,
that is positive for all π. This implies that for all 1 < λ′′S ≤ λ
′
S
∆S(π;λ′S) − ∆S(1 − π;λ
′′
S) ≥ ∆S(π; λ
′
S) − ∆S(1 − π;λ
′
S). (15)





(π λB + (1 − π))2
,
that is positive for all π. This implies that for all λ′′B ≥ λ
′
B > 1




B) − ∆B(1 − π; λ
′
B). (16)







λS(π) ≥ λS(1 − π)







λS(π) = λS(1 − π)
λB(π) = λB(1 − π)
, (17)
that is negative since π ≥ 1/2 by assumption.
Step 3: In the equilibrium, the information content of block sell orders is such that
λS(π) ≥ λS(1 − π), and the information content of block sell orders is such that
λB(π) ≤ λB(1 − π) for all π ≥ 1/2.
We will prove the proposition for the ask side of the market. The proof for the bid side
is symmetric and will be omitted. From the proof of Proposition 1 we already know
that If the separating equilibrium prevails on the ask side of the market both when
E[Ṽ ] = π and when E[Ṽ ] = 1 − π, then λB(π) = λB(1 − π) = λB . The function
fθ(·) in condition (4) is increasing in the public belief (∂fθ(·)/∂π = µ /γ > 0).
From condition (4), it follows that if the separating equilibrium arises when the public
belief is π, then it arises for all public belief lower than π. As a consequence, if
λB(π) = λB then λB(1 − π) = λB , as well.9 On the other hand, if when the
public belief is π a pooling equilibrium arises, that is λB(π) < λB , then when the
public belief is 1 − π either a separating or a pooling equilibrium can prevail. The
separating equilibrium arises if QL/QS ≥ 1 + fθ(1 − π), and λB(1 − π) = λB >
λB(π). The pooling equilibrium arises if QL/QS < 1 + fθ(1 − π) and, also in
this case, λB > λB(1 − π) > λB(π). Indeed, suppose that also when the public
belief is 1 − π condition (4) is not satisfied. Let be {(1 − σ); σ} the strategy of an
institutional buyer, and notice that, for any σ, the informational content of a block buy
is λBQL(σ) = (γ +µ σ)/γ and that of a small buy is λBQS (σ) = (γ +µ (1−σ))/γ.
Rearranging terms in (6), the ask price for quantity Qi, with i ∈ {S, L}, is
Apei =
λBQi(σ)π
λBQi(σ)π + (1 − π)
. (18)
9We are assuming π ≥ 1/2, then 1 − π ≤ π
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λBQL(σ)π + (1 − π)
λBQS (σ)π + (1 − π)
= f(π; σ) (19)
For any π, the equilibrium strategy σ(π) has to satisfy condition (19). By Dini’s








π[(λBQS (σ)π+(1−π))∂λBQL (σ)/∂σ−∂λBQS (σ)/∂σ]
< 0
(20)
since λBQL(σ) > λBQS (σ), ∂λBQL(·)/∂σ = µ/γ > 0 and ∂λBQS (·)/∂σ =
−µ/γ < 0. Thus, since π ≥ (1 − π) for all π ≥ 1/2, we can conclude that if a
pooling equilibrium arises when the public belief is 1−π then σ(1−π) ≥ σ(π) and
λBQL(σ(1 − π)) ≥ λBQL(σ(π)). 
15
Appendix B. Table and Figures
giovedì 8 novembre 2012
16
venerdì 9 novembre 2012
17
venerdì 9 novembre 2012
18











fϑ (π ,δ <1)




ˆ π  1− ˆ π   1 








(π ) +1  is  the  ratio  between  the  deviation  and  the 
separating  profits  of  an  informed  buyer,  fθ (π ,δ =1) +1  and 
fθ (π ,δ <1) +1  are  the  ratio  between  the  deviation  and  the 
separating    profits  of  an  informed  seller,  without    (δ =1)  and 







separating  equilibrium  arises  only  when  the  public  belief  is 
below  ˆ π ,  since  for  all  π > ˆ π     f
θ






Symmetrically,  in  the  absence  of  short  selling  constraints,  on 
the  bid  side  of  the  market  the  separating  equilibrium  arises 
only when  the  public  belief  is  above  1− ˆ π ,  since  for  all  π <1− ˆ π  





.  Instead,  if  short  selling 
constraints are sufficiently severe (that is, δ small enough), the 








venerdì 9 novembre 2012
References
[1] Aitken, M.J. and Frino, A. (1996), “Execution costs associated with institutional
trades on the Australian Stock Exchange,” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 4, pp.45-
58.
[2] Bessembinder, H. (2003), “Issues in Assessing Trade Execution Costs,” The Journal
of Financial Markets, 6, pp. 233-257.
[3] Chan, L.K.C. and Lakonishok, J. (1993), “Institutional trades and intraday stock price
behaviour,” Journal of Financial Economics, 33, pp. 173-199.
[4] Chan, L.K.C. and Lakonishok, J. (1995), “The behaviour of stock prices around insti-
tutional trades,” Journal of Finance, 50(4), pp. 1147-11174.
[5] Chiyachantana, C.N., Jain, P.K., Jiang, C. and Wood, R.A. (2004), “International
evidence on institutional trading behaviour and price impact,” Journal of Finance,
59, pp. 869-898.
[6] Easley, D.N. and O’Hara, M. (1987), “Price, trade size, and information in securities
markets,” Journal of Financial Economics, 19, pp. 69-90.
[7] Ellis, K., Michaely, R. and OÕHara, M. (2000), “The accuracy of trade classification
rules: Evidence from NASDAQ,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
35, pp. 529-552.
21
[8] Gemmill, G. (1996), “Transparency and liquidity: A study of block trades in the
London Stock Exchange under different publication rules,” Journal of Finance, 51,
pp.1765-1790.
[9] Holthausen, R., Leftwich, R. and Myers, D. (1987), “The effect of large block transac-
tions on security prices: A cross-sectional analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics,
19, pp. 237-268.
[10] Holthausen, R., Leftwich, R. and Myers, D. (1990), “Large-block transactions, the
speed of response, and temporary and permanent stock-price effects,” Journal of
Financial Economics, 26, pp.71-95.
[11] Keim, D.B. and Madhavan, A. (1995), “Anatomy of the trading process: Empirical
evidence on the behaviour of institutional traders,” Journal of Financial Economics,
37, pp. 371-398.
[12] Keim, D.B. and Madhavan, A. (1996), “The upstairs market for large-block transac-
tions: Analysis and measurement of price effects,” Review of Financial Studies, 9,
pp. 1-36.
[13] Kraus, A. and Stoll, H. (1972), “Price impacts of block trading on the New York Stock
Exchange,” Journal of Finance, 27, pp. 569-588.
[14] Lee, C.M.C. and Ready, M.J. (1991), “Inferring trade direction from intraday data,”
Journal of Finance, 46, pp. 733-746. pp. 45-58.
[15] Saar, G. (2001), “Price impact asymmetry of block trades: An institutional trading
explanation,” Review of Financial Studies, 14, pp. 1153-1182.
22
